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ABSTRACT 
Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort 
Determination  
by Erkki Koskela and Ronnie Schöb * 
In this paper, we study the impact of tax policy on wage negotiations, workers’ 
effort, and employment when effort is only imperfectly observable. We show 
that the different wage-setting motives – rent sharing and effort incentives – 
reinforce the effects of partial tax policy measures but not necessarily those of 
more fundamental tax reforms. We show that a higher degree of tax 
progression always leads to wage moderation, but the well-established result 
from the wage bargaining literature that a revenue-neutral increase in the 
degree of tax progression is good for employment does not carry over to the 
case with wage negotiations and imperfectly observable effort. While it remains 
true that introducing tax progression increases employment, we cannot rule out 
negative employment effects from an increase in tax progression when tax 
progression is already very high. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Wirkung progressiver Besteuerung bei kollektiven Lohnverhand-
lungen und unbeobachtbarem individuellen Arbeitseinsatz 
In einem Modell mit Lohnverhandlungen und unvollständiger Beobachtbarkeit 
individueller Arbeitsanstrengungen zeigen wir, dass sich die verschiedenen 
Motive bei der Lohnfindung – Verteilung von Renten zwischen Arbeitgeber und 
Arbeitnehmern, Effizienzlohnerwägungen – sich in ihren Wirkungen gegenseitig 
verstärken. Für die Auswirkungen der Steuerpolitik auf die Beschäftigung be-
deutet dies, dass eine progressivere Ausgestaltung des Steuersystems grund-
sätzlich zu mehr Lohnmoderation führt. Da eine höhere Steuerprogression 
jedoch zugleich die individuellen Anstrengungsanreize verringert, ist der Be-
schäftigungseffekt einer Steuerreform, die die Progression erhöht, a priori nicht 
eindeutig. Das aus der Lohnverhandlungsliteratur bekannte Ergebnis, dass 
Steuerprogression gut für die Beschäftigung sei, lässt sich somit in einem allge-
meineren Modellrahmen nicht bestätigen. Zwar ist die Beschäftigung bei einem 
moderat progressiven Steuersystem generell höher als bei einem proportio-
nalen Steuersystem, doch lassen sich negative Beschäftigungseffekte bei einer 
weiteren Erhöhung der Steuerprogression nicht ausschließen. 
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1. Introduction 
Tax progression leads to wage moderation and is thus good for employment. This result 
has been derived for different assumptions about the wage-setting motives such as rent 
sharing in wage bargaining models (see, e.g., Holm and Koskela 1996, Koskela and 
Vilmunen 1996, Koskela and Schöb 1999) or effort incentives in efficiency wage models, 
where firms unilaterally decide upon both the wage rate and the employment level (see, 
e.g., Pisauro 1991, Rasmussen 2002). 
The effect of tax progression, however, has not yet been analyzed in a uniform 
framework that combines these different wage-setting motives. So far, only very few 
papers have combined wage bargaining and effort considerations at all. Early 
contributions by Lindbeck and Snower (1991) and Sanfey (1993) do not provide a 
uniform answer to the question as to how far different wage-setting motives analyzed in 
efficiency wage and union bargaining models reinforce or weaken each other. Later, 
Bulkley and Myles (1996) show that with imperfect monitoring of workers’ effort, 
monopoly trade unions will set a higher wage than the pure efficiency wage set by the 
firms. This provides a higher bonus for non-shirking and results in a higher level of effort 
than we would observe in a competitive labor market. Garino and Martin (2000), on the 
other hand, show that efficiency wages offset the cost of higher wages and thus induce 
firms to make more concessions in wage negotiations. Thus there is theoretical evidence 
that the different wage-setting motives reinforce each other. 
Within such a framework, Altenburg and Straub (1998) analyze variations of the 
benefit-replacement ratio. They find that, in contrast to the standard result in both 
efficiency wage and union bargaining models, the effect of a higher reservation utility on 
wages, employment, and effort is ambiguous when benefits are financed through lump-
sum taxes. A higher replacement ratio may then reduce the wage rate and raise 
employment. A higher reservation utility of workers will induce firms to reduce their 
demand for effective labor. If, as a consequence, the labor share decreases, firms 
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experience a higher relative reduction in profits from a wage increase. This explains why 
the wage may actually fall and – in the end – employment will rise. 
To our knowledge, only one paper analyzes the impact of taxes in this framework. 
Garcia and Rios (2004) adopt the Altenburg and Straub (2002) model to analyze revenue-
neutral tax reforms numerically. Their numerical calculations suggest that a revenue-
neutral increase in the tax exemption that is financed by an increase in the wage tax 
increases employment. This indicates that the result by Koskela and Schöb (1999), 
according to which a revenue-neutral shift from payroll taxes to wage taxes raises 
employment when there is a higher tax exemption for the latter, also applies when effort 
is unobservable. Furthermore, they argue that it is better for employment in the case of 
constant fiscal revenues to compensate higher tax exemption through increases in wage 
taxes rather than payroll taxes. Since Garcia and Rios (2004) only provide numerical, 
rather than analytical, results, we first present an analytical framework to elaborate the 
way in which tax policy affects wage negotiations and employment when effort is only 
imperfectly observable and trade unions and firms negotiate on wages.  
Our comparative statics analysis indicates that the standard results from the trade 
union literature must be modified in the case of imperfect monitoring of individual effort 
determination. In these standard models, tax policy only affects wages by altering the size 
of the labor surplus. When both wage-setting motives are present, however, tax policy 
also affects the strength with which tax policy parameters affect the negotiated wage and 
employment. When effort is not observable, tax policy affects the wage elasticity of 
effort, which in turn affects the wage elasticity of labor demand. Since these alter the 
scope with which workers can attract labor rents, this constitutes an additional channel by 
which tax policy can influence the wage negotiation. As it turns out, this additional 
impact reinforces the effects of partial tax policy measures that we observe in the 
standard bargaining and efficiency models. 
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Table 1: Labor taxation in the OECD countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Country Average wage tax 
Marginal 
wage tax 
average wage 
tax rate 
progression
ARP 
Calculated 
relative tax 
exemption 
a/w 
Australia 28.6 35.4 6.8 22.9 
Austria 44.9 55.5 10.6 56.1 
Belgium 54.2 66.4 12.2 34.8 
Canada 32.3 33.9 1.6 26.4 
Czech Republic 43.6 48.1 4.5 34.9 
Denmark 41.5 49.2 7.7 20.7 
Finland 43.8 55.1 11.3 36.6 
France 47.4 66.6 19.2 30.3 
Germany 50.7 64.0 13.3 44.9 
Greece 34.9 44.2 9.3 95.2 
Hungary 45.8 54.7 8.9 52.3 
Iceland 29.7 40.4 10.7 30.7 
Ireland 23.8 33.2 9.4 49.5 
Italy 45.7 58.0 12.3 46.7 
Japan 26.6 31.5 4.9 47.8 
Korea 16.6 24.8 8.2 80.0 
Luxembourg 31.9 45.9 14.0 64.5 
Mexico 15.4 23.4 8.0 78.1 
Netherlands 43.6 50.7 7.1 56.6 
New Zealand 20.7 33.0 12.3 37.3 
Norway 36.9 43.2 6.3 25.4 
Poland 43.1 45.7 2.6 33.7 
Portugal 32.6 39.4 6.8 60.0 
Slovak Republic 42.0 48.3 6.3 52.1 
Spain 38.0 45.5 7.5 43.3 
Sweden 48.0 51.7 3.7 17.0 
Switzerland 28.8 36.5 7.7 46.7 
Turkey 42.7 44.5 1.8 12.5 
United Kingdom 31.2 40.6 9.4 35.1 
United States 29.6 34.1 4.5 22.5 
Source: OECD (2004)  
Legend: Tax rates are for the year 2004 for a single person with 100% of average wage, 
relative to the gross wage including the social security contributions paid by employees. 
Column (3) shows the difference between marginal and average rate of income tax. As an 
approximation it is assumed that for each country the tax schedule consists of a tax 
exemption and a constant marginal tax rate. The exchange rate between US dollar and euro 
was assumed to be unity. Social assistance level does not include housing costs. Numbers for 
social assistance are from 2002 and taken from OECD (2004), Benefits and Wages, OECD 
Indicators. 
In the second main part of the paper, we then analyze revenue-neutral tax reforms that 
change the degree of tax progression, and derive the qualitative effects such tax reforms 
have on the negotiated wage, individual effort, and aggregate employment. Table 1 
highlights the importance of such an analysis. The labor tax systems in all the OECD 
countries are progressive and show significant differences in the degree of tax 
progression. We measure tax progression by the difference between marginal and average 
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tax rates that are shown in the first and second columns.1 This difference, reported in the 
third column, is known as the average wage tax progression ARP (see Lambert 2001 and 
our section 5). The higher this difference, the more progressive wage taxation is. The 
highest difference is for France, with 19.2 percentage points, and the lowest one for 
Canada, with only 1.4 percentage points.  
Our first main result shows that an increase in wage tax progression always leads to 
wage moderation. In this respect, our model shows that the wage moderation effect of 
higher tax progression that is present in both the efficiency wage model and the 
bargaining model carries over to the more general case when both wage-setting motives 
are at work. The effect on effort and, consequently, on labor demand, however, is 
ambiguous. Although it remains true that introducing tax progression raises employment, 
it turns out that the claim “tax progression is good for employment” (Koskela and 
Vilmunen 1996) only applies to moderate degrees of tax progression. 
In section 2 below, we present the basic structure of the model and describe the time 
sequence of decisions with respect to wage bargaining, labor demand, and individual 
effort determination. The workers’ individual effort determination and the firms’ labor 
demand are elaborated in section 3. Section 4 uses the Nash bargaining approach to 
analyze wage negotiations subject to firms’ labor demand and workers’ effort 
determination and presents the essential comparative static results. Section 5 applies the 
analysis to revenue-neutral changes in the labor tax structure and explores the effects of 
tax progression on the negotiated wage, individual effort, and employment. The main 
findings are summarized in section 6. 
                                                 
1 To make these figures comparable with our stylized model framework below, all tax rates are with 
reference to the gross wage, including payroll taxes paid by the employer. 
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2. Basic framework 
Concerning the time sequence of decisions, we assume that the government behaves as a 
Stackelberg leader who fixes the tax parameters in the first stage. To raise revenues, the 
government can employ a wage tax t, which is levied on the gross wage w minus a tax 
exemption a . Thus the tax base for the wage tax t  equals Law )( − , where L  denotes 
total employment. In the presence of a positive tax exemption a, the marginal tax rate t 
exceeds the average tax rate )1( watt a −≡  so that we have a linearly progressive tax 
system. The net-of-tax wage workers receive is given by tawtwn +−= )1( . We abstract 
away from payroll taxes. 
At stage 2, firms and trade unions bargain with respect to the gross wage.2 They take 
the tax parameters as given and anticipate the consequences that the negotiated gross 
wage has for labor demand by firms and that the resulting net labor income has for 
individual effort determination by workers. After the wage negotiations are settled, the 
firms decide at stage 3 about their labor demand. Since firms cannot perfectly observe 
effort, the firms have to anticipate the workers’ individual effort decisions. At the final 
stage, stage 4, workers make their individual effort choice. The time sequence of 
decisions is summarized in Figure 1. In the subsequent sections we derive the decisions 
taking place at different stages by using backward induction. 
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
1  s tag es t
Ta x policy
( , )t a
W ag e
ba rga ining  ( )w
La bo r
de m an d ( )L
Effo rt
de te rm in ation ( )e
2  s ta gen d 3  sta gerd 4  s taget h
 
                                                 
2  Since tax parameters are given from the viewpoint of firms and trade unions, it does not matter whether 
they bargain over gross or net-of-tax wages (see Koskela and Schöb 2002). 
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3. Individual effort determination and labor demand 
We start by analyzing the 4th stage, where workers decide about their working effort, 
taking the tax policy, the negotiated wage, and aggregate employment as given. Then we 
analyze stage 3, where firms determine employment. 
3.1.  Individual effort determination 
We focus on the choice that a single worker faces when employed by a representative 
firm in a static framework. Effort cannot be fully controlled by firms. They can set a 
standard effort that we normalize to one. If workers meet this standard, their jobs are 
secure. If they shirk by providing less effort, however, firms can fire them. The 
probability of detection depends positively on monitoring effort. Following Bental and 
Demougin (2006), we consider an isoelastic probability function of employment de  
where [ ]1;0∈d  denotes the (constant) probability elasticity of effort. The probability of 
being laid off is thus de−1 . Assuming a representative risk-neutral worker and applying a 
specific utility function V  that is additively separable and quasi-linear, we obtain 
(1) beegweV dndw )1()]([ −+−= , 
where b  denotes the workers’ outside option, which equals some exogenous 
unemployment income, and )(eg  denotes the disutility of effort e as a convex function, 
i.e. 0)(''),(' >egeg . Working time per worker is fixed and normalized to unity. 
For the following, it is convenient to define the workers’ surplus as the difference 
begws n −−≡ )( . This allows us to rewrite the utility function as bseV dw += , which 
splits the utility into the expected surplus when working with effort e  and the basic 
income b , which the household receives in any case. The optimal individual effort level 
can be derived from the first-order condition 0)('1 =−= − egesdeV ddwe . The worker 
chooses an effort level at which the expected utility loss of working harder, which occurs 
with probability de , equals the expected utility gain from an increased probability of 
 7
staying in employment and receiving the surplus s. Using the parameterization 
1,/)( >θθ= θeeg , the effort function becomes: 
(2) ( ) ( )θθθθ −≡−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
θ+
θ
=
111
1
bwAbw
d
de nn . 
It is straightforward to show that individual effort is increasing in the net-of-tax wage 
rate, and decreasing in the outside option. This implies that we have 0<te , because this 
lowers the net-of-tax wage and thus reduces the penalty when caught shirking. 
Accordingly, we observe 0>we  and 0>ae . In fact, we have at et
awe )( −−= , a property 
we will employ later on. The wage elasticity of effort is 
(3) 0
)(
)1(
>
−θ
−
=≡ε
bw
tw
e
we
n
w . 
The respective partial derivatives with respect to the outside option b, the tax exemption 
a, and the tax rate t are  
(4) 0
)(
)1(
2 <
−θ
−
−=ε
bw
ttw
na , 
(5) 2)(
)(
bw
abw
nt
−θ
−
=ε . 
The partial derivatives (4) and (5) depend on the effects the respective parameters have 
on the net-of-tax wage relative to the income surplus of working. With respect to an 
increase in the tax rate, this effect is ambiguous since a rise in the wage tax lowers 
)1( tw −  but at the same time raises the effective tax credit ta . A higher tax rate always 
increases the difference between the net-of-tax rate in absolute terms, but it may lower the 
relative difference, which is decisive for the elasticity if the tax exemption a is very 
generous. If ab = , the wage elasticity of effort is unaffected by t since in this case we 
have ))(1()( bwtbwn −−=− . A higher tax exemption a implies that a wage rate increase 
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has a lower relative impact on the net-of-tax wage and thus implies a lower wage 
elasticity of effort. Only if ab >  does a rise in the tax rate increase the impact a rise in 
the wage rate has on effort: the higher t is, the stronger the relative increase of bwn −  due 
to a wage increase is and thus the stronger the relative effect on individual effort. 
The direct effect of a change in the tax exemption is unambiguous. An increase in the 
tax exemption implies that a marginal wage increase now has a lower relative impact. 
3.2. Labor demand 
In the 3rd stage of the game, each firm takes the tax parameters and the negotiated wage 
as given and decides about the labor demand L  by taking into account how the 
representative worker will adjust effort. To derive an explicit solution, we postulate a 
decreasing returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function in terms of labor and 
effort: 
(6) δ
−δ
−δ
δ
=
1
)(
1
)( eLeLf ,   1>δ . 
Profit is given by wLeLf −=π )( . Since firms anticipate the effort level, workers will 
provide ( 0=eV ), and the first order profit maximization condition is 
weeLfL −==π )('0 . Using this specification, we obtain the following labor demand 
function: 
(7) 1−δδ−= ewL . 
The partial derivative of labor demand with respect to the tax parameters and the 
negotiated wage rate are 
 0)1( <−δ=
e
eLL tt , 0
)1(
>
−δ
=
e
eLL aa , 
 0))1(()1(21)1( <δ+δ−ε−=−δ+δ−= −δδ−−δ−δ−
w
LeewewL ww . 
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Since the wage tax and the tax exemption are levied on workers, they only affect labor 
demand via the workers’ individual effort, which depends on the net-of-tax wage rate. 
The wage rate w affects labor demand in two different ways. Note that the standard 
assumption that profit decreases with increases in the wage rate implies that the wage 
elasticity of effort is smaller than one, i.e. 1<ε . For the concave production function (6), 
the wage elasticity of labor demand depends on both the technological parameter δ  and 
the wage elasticity of individual effort ε  as defined in (3): 
(8) δ+δ−ε=δ≡− )1(*
L
wLw . 
The wage elasticity of labor demand is lower compared to the case where wages do not 
affect effort. It now depends negatively on the wage elasticity of effort. For 10 <ε≤  we 
have δ≤δ< *1 . Hence, in the presence of unobservable individual effort determination 
the wage elasticity of labor demand depends on the tax structure and thus tax policy. If, 
for instance, a tax reform increases the wage elasticity of effort, labor demand would 
become less elastic. A wage rise would then be less costly for a trade union since the firm 
would then lay off fewer workers. 
The firm’s indirect profit function, which we will use in the next section, can be 
obtained by inserting labor demand (7) into the profit function:  
(9) 
)1(
)(),(
11
11*
−δ
=−=π
−δδ−
−δδ−δδ− ewewewfew . 
Having analyzed workers’ and firms’ behavior with respect to effort and labor demand, 
we can now turn to the collective wage bargaining of stage 2. 
4. Collective wage bargaining 
To derive the negotiated wage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution within a ‘right-to-
manage’ model according to which employment is unilaterally determined by the firms. 
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The wage bargaining takes place in anticipation of the optimal employment decision by 
the firms (8) and the optimal individual effort decision by workers (2).  
The trade union maximizes the sum of the workers utility wV , and the utility of the 
unemployed. Since those caught shirking and fired are replaced by unemployed workers, 
the expected utility of an unemployed worker is 
(10) ))(()1()1(1 *egw
LN
Leb
LN
LeV nddu −
−
−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−−= . 
While we assume that a single worker who is caught shirking will become and remain 
unemployed as well as receive b , from the viewpoint of the trade union, an unemployed 
member will replace a laid-off worker with the lay-off probability, which is de−1  times 
the employment share. We can rewrite the linear utilitarian objective function of the trade 
union as  
(11) NbLesLNVLVU uw +=−+= ** )()(ˆ , 
where the first term captures the workers’ surplus from employment and the second term 
captures the exogenously given minimum income for all N members. *L  denotes optimal 
employment and *e  optimal effort in the s  term. We denote the relative bargaining 
power of the union by β , and that of the firm by )1( β− , and assume that the threat points 
of the trade union and the firm are described by NbU =0  and 00 =π , respectively. 
Applying the Nash bargaining solution, the negotiating parties decide on the wage w  in 
order to solve  
(12) {
β−βπ=Ω 1*
)(
)( UwMax
w
,  s.t.  0=π= LeV ,  
where **0 )(ˆ LesUUU =−=  is the bargaining surplus to the trade union by including the 
disutility of effort and *π  is the indirect profit, presented in equation (9). The Nash 
bargaining solution satisfies the following first-order condition: 
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(13) 0)1( *
*
=
π
πβ−+β=Ω www U
U . 
As shown in appendix A, we can solve the first-order condition (13) to find the following 
implicit Nash bargaining solution for the wage rate in the presence of individual effort 
determination: 
(14) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+
≡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
θ+
β+ε−−δ
ε−−δ+β
=
t
tabegM
t
tabeg
d
d
w
1
)(
1
)(
)(
)1)(1(
)1)(1( ** , 
where 1)( <θ+dd  and thus 1>M  for 1≤ε . The negotiated gross wage rate depends 
on the exogenous income b  when unemployed, the wage tax t  and the tax exemption a . 
Furthermore, it also depends on the disutility from providing effort )( *eg  and the term 
M, which we can interpret as the mark-up. Apart from exogenous parameters, this mark-
up also depends on the wage elasticity of effort. 
Before we discuss the general case, we will first briefly discuss several special cases, 
which can be analyzed within the framework developed here. 
A. Observable effort 
When effort is observable and verifiable, it can become part of the wage contract. If the 
contract specifies some fixed effort level e , we obtain the standard right-to-manage 
model of union bargaining, where the wage depends on the bargaining power of the trade 
union and the (constant) wage elasticity of labor demand in the case of a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Since a constant individual effort e  implies 0=ε  and a zero 
probability of being caught shirking, 0=d , we have 
(15) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+
≡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−δ
−δ+β
=
==ε t
tabegM
t
tabegw
d 1
)(
1
)(
)1(
)1(
0
, 
which implies a surplus of =s ( )tabeg −+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−δ
β )(
)1(
. From (16), we can easily derive 
the special cases of a monopoly union 
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 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−δ
δ
=
=β==ε t
tabegw
d 1
)(
11,0
 
and the competitive labor market outcome where unions have no bargaining power and 
the gross wage only compensates for the disutility of working 
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−+
=
=β==ε t
tabegw
d 1
)(
0
, 
in which case the firm exploits the complete workers’ surplus, i.e. 0=s . 
B. Unobservable effort without bargaining 
When 0=β , the firm unilaterally sets the wage. From the first-order condition 0* =πw , it 
follows immediately that the firm acts according to the well-known Solow-condition 
(Solow 1979), i.e. we have 1=ε  and thus 
(16) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−
≡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−θ
θ
=
=π t
tabM
t
tabw
w 111 0
. 
The model therefore also captures the essence of the efficiency models with a mark-up 
over the total outside option. 
C. Unobservable effort with bargaining: comparative statics 
For the general case, we have 0)1( >ε−  and the mark-up is larger than one when the 
trade union has some bargaining power, 0>β . It increases with the relative bargaining 
power of the trade union β , and depends negatively on the direct wage elasticity of labor 
demand δ . The wage rate now depends on several new terms that, in addition to the 
relative bargaining power, the wage elasticity of labor demand, the exogenous income, 
and the tax parameters, enter the formula: (i) the exogenously given probability of 
monitoring workers d , (ii) the indirect effect )( *eg  via effort provision, and (iii) the 
elasticity of effort determination ε . Furthermore, unlike in the case of observable effort, 
the exogenous income b  when unemployed, the wage tax rate t , and the tax exemption 
a  will also affect the wage rate via the mark-up M .  
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The impact of a better monitoring of workers on the negotiated wage is zero as the 
wage elasticity of effort is not affected by monitoring. We can thus focus on the 
comparative statics of the tax parameters and the outside option in what follows. In doing 
so, we will call the term )1/())(( * ttabeg −−+  the total outside option.  
The tax exemption affects the negotiated wage positively both via the mark-up and 
the total outside option as follows (see appendix B) 
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with 0)1()('1 1*1 >−−ε−=∆ −−ε teeMgwMM ww . In the Nash bargaining with observable 
effort (15), the mark-up is independent of a . With unobservable effort, however, workers 
will increase effort when the tax exemption rises. This, ceteris parabus lowers the mark-
up because a lower wage elasticity of effort implies a higher wage elasticity of labor 
demand (see equation (8)). A higher wage then induces less effort, which makes the 
worker less productive. As a consequence more layoffs result from a wage increase.  
The effect of the wage tax rate can be expressed as  
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(see Appendix B). The total effect of a higher wage tax rate on the negotiated wage is a 
priori ambiguous. When we assume ab ≥ , both the effect on the mark-up and the effect 
on the total outside option with the given mark-up are unambiguously positive. 
Hence, tax parameters in our model with both Nash wage bargaining and individual 
effort determination affect both of these via a change in the difference between the net-of-
tax wage income and the outside option as well as via a change in the mark-up.  
We summarize our new characterization of the negotiated wage under individual 
effort determination in 
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Proposition 1: Unobservable individual effort determination strengthens the 
effects tax policy measures have on the negotiated wage compared to the case 
where effort is observable. Decreasing the tax exemption lowers the 
negotiated wage. An increase in the wage tax rate increases the negotiated 
wage when ab ≥ . 
We can easily verify that the effects indeed reinforce each other. If we take the partial 
derivative of (15), we obtain the comparative statics effect for the standard bargaining 
model with 
0
10
<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
=
==ε t
tMw
da
, ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+
=
==ε 20 1
)(
t
abegMw
dt
. 
For ab ≥ , the effects tax parameter changes have on the negotiated wage when effort is 
observable are always reinforced when effort is not observable. The partial derivative of 
equation (16) with respect to a  shows the same result for the efficiency wage model: the 
different wage-setting motives thus reinforce the partial tax policy effects on gross wages. 
We should note, however, that in the case where ab ≤  and 0)( >−+ abeg  we would 
obtain opposite partial effects for changes in the wage tax rate. An increase in the wage 
tax will then increase the gross wage when effort is observable but will lower the gross 
wage when effort is unobservable. 
5. Tax-revenue-neutral change in tax progression in terms of 
wage formation, employment, and individual effort 
We are now ready to analyze the impact a revenue-neutral restructuring of the labor tax, 
i.e. the degree of wage tax progression, has on wage formation, individual effort 
determination, and employment. The effect of wage tax progression, which keeps the tax 
revenue [ ]LawtG )( −=  constant, can be written in the following way: 
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[ ]dwLawttLtLdaLdtawdG w)()(0 −++−−== . Recalling the definition of the average 
tax as ( )watt a −≡ 1 , this can be expressed as 
(19) dw
t
ttdt
t
awda
a
dG
)()( *
0
δ−
+
−
=
=
. 
An appropriate and intuitive way to define tax progression is to look at the average tax 
rate progression (ARP), which is given by the difference between the marginal tax rate t  
and the average tax rate t a , attARP −= . The tax system is progressive if ARP is 
positive, and tax progression is increased if the difference increases (at a given income 
level, see Lambert 2001, chapters 7 and 8). The term *δ− att  indicates the marginal tax 
revenue per worker when the gross wage increases. It can be decomposed in such a way 
that we have a tax progression effect and a tax level effect: )1( *δ−+ atARP . The total 
effect is non-positive for a linear tax system with 0=ARP  since 0)1( * ≤δ− , but may 
eventually become positive if the tax system is sufficiently progressive since the 
employment effect is weighted by the average tax rate only. As we will see later on, the 
degree of tax progression is decisive for the way in which a revenue-neutral change in tax 
progression affects both employment and individual effort. 
5.1 Revenue-neutral tax progression and the negotiated wage 
The total effect of changes in the tax parameters t and a on the negotiated wage is 
(20) dawdtwdw at += , 
with the partial derivatives derived in section 4. Substituting (19) into the RHS of (20) for 
da  gives 
(21) dw
t
ttwdtw
t
awdtwdw
a
aat ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ δ−
+
−
+=
*)( , 
and, thus, the total effect of a revenue-neutral increase in the wage tax rate is  
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(22) 1*
0 )(1
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=
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−
+
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tttw
w
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aww
dt
dw
a
a
at
dG
. 
In what follows, we assume Laffer-efficiency in the sense that a higher wage tax 
increases tax revenues while a higher tax exemption leads to lower tax revenues even 
when we take account of the indirect effects via changes in w. With respect to the tax 
exemption, we then have 
 01ˆ
*
<⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ δ−
−−=+−=
t
ttwtLwGtLG
a
aawa . 
Substituting the partial derivatives aw  from (17) and tw  from (18) into the numerator of 
(22) shows that the numerator is unambiguously positive (see appendix C). Hence, we 
have the following:  
Proposition 2 (wage moderation): A revenue-neutral increase in wage tax 
progression will moderate the negotiated wage in the presence of individual 
effort determination. 
The interpretation is straightforward as it turns out that the numerator in equation (24) 
denotes the compensated effect an increase in the tax rate has on the wage, keeping the 
value of the Nash maximand constant (see appendix D). The revenue-neutral increase in 
the tax exemption fully offsets the income effect of the higher wage tax so that only the 
substitution effect of this progression-enhancing tax reform remains. This finding shows 
that the result from conventional ‘right-to-manage’ models in the absence of effort 
considerations (see, e.g., Koskela and Vilmunen 1996) also applies when we allow for 
unobservable individual effort determination.  
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5.2 Revenue-neutral tax progression and individual effort determination 
The total effect of changes in the tax parameters t and a and the negotiated wage on effort 
determination is dwedaedtede wat ++= . Substituting the RHS of the tax-revenue 
neutrality (19) for da  gives 
(23) 
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It is only the induced wage-moderation that affects individual effort decisions. The term 
tea  measures the impact one additional euro has on individual effort. A wage reduction 
of one euro reduces the net-of-tax wage by )1( t−  so that effort falls by ttea )1( − . 
Wage-moderation also affects the amount by which the tax exemption can be raised. It 
will be lower than the neutral effect of raising a  by taw )( −  if 0* <δ− att . This always 
holds in a linear tax system but if the tax system becomes very progressive, i.e. 
01 * >δ− at , individual effort eventually will fall. This case is all the more likely, the 
smaller the wage elasticity of labor demand and the average tax burden are. If we assume 
a labor share of 2/3, we have 3=δ , and an average tax below 1/3 would suffice to let 
effort fall when progression rises. Formally, we have 
(24) *
0
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>
=
a
dG
t
dt
de . 
A sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for individual effort to fall is 1<δt  since we 
have δ<δ*  and tta < . These findings can be summarized in 
Proposition 3 (individual effort determination): A revenue-neutral increase 
in wage tax progression will lower individual effort if (i) the wage elasticity 
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of labor demand and/or (ii) the marginal tax rate are sufficiently low. A 
sufficient condition is 1<δt . 
5.3 Revenue-neutral tax progression and employment 
Finally, we consider the employment effect. The total effect of changes in the tax 
parameters t and a and the negotiated wage on employment is dwLdaLdtLdL wat ++= . 
Substituting the RHS of (19) for da  gives  
(25) 
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The first two terms cancel out since they cover the change in t  and a  that ceteris 
parabus. would leave the average tax burden, and thus the net-of-tax wage, constant. 
Hence, we are left with two effects. As we have seen in section 5.2, the tax reform affects 
individual effort. If – as is likely – effort decreases, labor productivity falls and ceteris 
parabus employment. On the other hand, the wage-moderating effect increases labor 
demand for any given effort level. The total effect thus becomes ambiguous. From 
proposition 3 we can immediately infer 
Proposition 4 (rising employment): A sufficient, but not necessary, 
condition that a revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression will 
increase employment is 1* ≥δat . 
Substituting the RHS of (23) for 
0=dGdt
de in (25) we obtain 
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From equation (25), it follows immediately that starting from a linear tax system, 
employment will definitely rise. This leads to 
Proposition 5 (rising employment): Introducing tax progression is good for 
employment when wages are negotiated and effort is determined individually. 
Although we have seen that different wage-setting motives reinforce tax policy effects on 
gross wages, this is not no longer true with respect to employment. With observable and 
verifiable effort, employment is always decreasing when tax progression rises. When 
effort is unobservable and not verifiable, we find a countervailing effect via the adverse 
effect a rise in tax progression has on individual effort.  
6. Conclusions 
We provide an extended framework to study the implications of the imperfectly 
observable individual effort of workers on the negotiated wage and the impact of a 
revenue-neutral change in the wage tax progression on wage negotiations, effort, and 
employment. The first, and most important, result is that a higher degree of tax 
progression always leads to wage moderation. Our model confirms this result for the case 
of observable effort and wage bargaining as well as for the case where firms set 
efficiency wages unilaterally: the different wage-setting motives reinforce partial tax 
policy effects present in each model. However, when effort is not observable and 
verifiable, the clear-cut effect well-known from the wage bargaining literature that tax 
progression is good for employment does not carry over to the case of imperfectly 
observable effort. In the general case, it remains true that introducing tax progression is 
good for employment, but if the adverse effect on effort becomes sufficiently large due to 
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too high a degree of tax progression, we cannot rule out the case where employment falls 
as a consequence of a progressivity-enhancing tax reform. 
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Appendix A: the negotiated wage 
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms ** ππw  and UUw  in the first-order 
condition (13) that determines the Nash bargaining solution. We start by looking at the 
profit response of the firm to a change in the wage rate. The indirect profit function was 
presented in equation (9). By applying the envelope theorem, according to which the 
effect which takes place through the labor demand vanishes at the optimum, we find that 
(A1) 
[ ]
[ ] ,01)(1)(
))(1())(1(
)1(
1
11
111
121*
<ε−−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−=
−δ−−δ
−δ
=π
−δδ−
−−δδ−
−δδ−−δδ−
w
ew
e
wewew
eweew
w
ww
 
from which it follows that  
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as .1<ε  With respect to the trade union’s utility, we find that  
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Substituting (A4) and (A2) into (14) yields 
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This can be rewritten as: 
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Using the definition of the total wage elasticity of labor demand *δ , we obtain 
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Appendix B: comparative statics of the negotiated wage in terms of outside option, 
wage tax, and tax exemption  
To see the effect the parameters have on the mark-up, it is convenient to change notation 
slightly: 
 
N
d
d
M )1)(1(
)(
)1)(1(
)1)(1( ε−−δ+β
=
+θ
β+ε−−δ
ε−−δ+β
= . 
The mark-up with respect to ε  is 
(B1) 0
)(
)1(
2 >+θ
θ−δβ
=ε dN
M . 
The mark-up with respect to effort e is 0=eM . Condition (13) is an implicit function of 
w . Thus the partial derivative with respect to, for example, a  is 
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First we have to sign the term in square brackets: 
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With 0>∆ , it is straightforward to sign the first term in equation (16) because 
.0<εε aM  The second term in equation (16) is also positive since 
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In equation (19), we have 
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which is positive if 0>− ab . QED. 
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Appendix C: the sign of the numerator of (22) 
Substituting the partial derivatives (19) and (20) into the numerator of (22) yields 
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Appendix D: the Slutzky-decomposition for the total effect of the wage tax on the 
negotiated wage  
Differentiating the indirect Nash maximand 01** Ω=π=Ω β−βU , where *sLU =  and 
**** )1()( LswLef +−=π , with respect to t and a gives 
(D1) (i) 0)(*1*11*1* <−πβ−=πβ=Ω β−−ββ−−β awLUUU tt , 
 (ii) 0*1*11*1* >πβ=πβ=Ω β−−ββ−−β tLUUU aa . 
The wage tax has a negative effect and tax exemption has a positive effect on the Nash 
maximand. Using the comparative statics, the indirect Nash maximand can be inverted in 
terms of a  for the function ),( 0Ω= tha . Substituting this for a in 01** VU =π=Ω β−β  
gives the compensated indirect Nash maximand 00* )),(,( Ω=ΩΩ tht .3 Differentiating this 
compensated indirect Nash maximand with respect to t  gives 0** =Ω+Ω att h  so that 
tawh att /)(/
**
−=ΩΩ−= . This describes the relationship of tax parameters to keep the 
Nash maximand constant. 
                                                 
3   See, e.g., Diamond and Yaari (1972). 
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According to the duality theorem, the Nash maximand wage function w  and the 
compensated wage function cw  at the same Nash maximand level are equal, so that we 
have ),()),(,( 00 Ω=Ω twthtw c . Differentiating this with respect to the wage tax gives 
c
tatt wwhw =+  so that we obtain the Slutsky equation  
(D2) a
c
tt wt
awww )( −−= , 
where the total effect of the wage tax rate has been decomposed into the negative 
substitution effect ( 0<ctw , see Appendix C) and the positive income effect 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
− awt
aw )( . QED. 
